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Abstract
An economy can improve its technology level through two channels – imitating from the
world technology frontier and innovating on its own technology level – innovation being more
skilled-intensive than imitation. I develop a growth model based on the endogenous ability-
driven skill acquisition decision of an individual in an imperfect credit market. It is shown
that there exists a constant level of skilled and unskilled human capital in the imitation-
only and innovation-only regimes. In the imitation-innovation regime stock of skilled human
capital rises whereas that of unskilled human capital falls in the imitation-innovation regime.
Also, both skilled and unskilled human capital shift from imitation to the innovation activity
as an economy progresses. Moreover, growth rate falls in the imitation-only regime. But
in the diversified regime growth rate rises even if it falls initially and there exists constant
level of growth rate in the innovation-only regime. In the long run all the economies will
converge to the world technology frontier and grow at a same rate. In the imitation-only
and innovation-only regimes, there exists constant level of upward and downward mobility.
However, in the diversified regime both upward and downward mobility falls as an economy
progresses to the frontier. Along with that, I show that wage rate and average income
of both skilled and unskilled human capital falls in the imitation-only regime and the same
rises in the innovation-only regime. However, wage rate and average income of skilled human
capital rises and unskilled human capital falls in the diversified regime. Also, there exists
constant level of between group income inequality in the imitation-only and innovation-only
regimes. However, wage and income inequality between skilled and unskilled human capital
rises as an economy bridges its gap from the world technology frontier. There exists constant
level of income inequality within skilled and unskilled human capital due to parental income
differences and due to difference in cognitive ability, in the imitation-only and innovation-
only regime. On the other hand, income inequality within skilled and unskilled human
capital rises due to parental income differences and due to difference in cognitive ability, in
the imitation-innovation regime.
Journal of Economic Literature Classifications: I24, J20, O30, O31, O33, O40.
Key Words: R & D activity, Outsourcing, Economic Growth, Endogenous Labor Composi-
tion, Imitation-Innovation, Convergence.
Address correspondence to: Sujata Basu, Room No 209, Centre for International Trade and
Development, School of Social Science, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Mehrauli Road,
New Delhi 110067, INDIA. Mobile: 91-9717675108. Email: sujata.eco@gmail.com
2
1 Introduction
For quite a long time economists have been struggling to understand the possible causes
and mechanisms driving economic growth and cross-country income differences. In 2010,
the purchasing power parity (PPP) adjusted GDP per capita for Argentina relative to the
United States of America (US) was 31.16, for Mexico 28.84, for India 8.58 and for Nigeria
it was only 3.5.1 In the same year, the PPP adjusted GDP per capita in current prices in
US was US $46568.57, whereas in Mexico it was only US $13430.03. In India it was around
US $3995.61 and in Nigeria it was $1629.50. The question that surfaces is: why different
economies have different income levels and economic growth rates. Is there any possibility
of convergence or over time will this gap increase?
The first thing that strikes is why are people so concerned about high growth rate and
higher levels of income? Is it in any way related to better well-being of individuals? Acemoglu
(2008, Ch:1) points toward several development indicators that corroborate this. It is found
that the richest countries are not only producing 30 times more than the poorest countries
but also consuming 30 times more than them. Further, life expectancy at birth is almost
80 years in the richest countries whereas the same for Sub-Saharan Africa is only between
40-50 years. According to Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002), Banerjee and Iyer (2005) and Guha
and Guha (2008) the divergence among countries have started around 200 years ago, when
industrial revolution happened in the European countries and they began to trade with the
entire world. Institutions evolved during that time still persist today.
Looking at the literature on institutions, composition of human capital and economic
growth I find that when technological progress involves both imitation and innovation, Van-
denbussche et al. (2006), Aghion and Howitt (2006), Aghion et al. (2009) have shown that
skilled human capital is growth enhancing in a relatively advanced economy whereas un-
1Data Sources are Alan Heston, Robert Summers and Bettina Aten, Penn World Table Version 7.1,
Center for International Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices at the University of Pennsylvania,
July 2012.
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skilled human capital is growth enhancing in a relatively backward economy.2 Thus, to be
on a higher growth trajectory, a relatively backward economy should invest more on primary
and secondary education and as it becomes relatively advanced it should change its policy
and concentrate more on tertiary education. In Basu and Mehra (2014), I endogenize the
composition of human capital and show that skilled human capital is growth enhancing in
the diversified regime and not the unskilled human capital. Moreover, they show that skilled
human capital is growth enhancing in the innovation-only regime whereas unskilled human
capital is growth enhancing in the imitation-only regime. However, none of the above studies
have considered the situation when capital markets are imperfect – they ignore the fact that
acquiring education is more difficult for the poor. So, in this paper, on the consumption side
I incorporate the possibility of capital market imperfection by assuming that an individual
cares about his/ her child’s income and thus leaves bequest for him/ her. That is, one can
connect the intergenerational income of individuals by allowing the possibility of bequests.
An individual who has acquired higher education level, and consequently has higher income,
leaves more bequest for his/her child. That is, the child of a richer parent is more privileged
and therefore has a higher probability of becoming more educated. To be precise, under capi-
tal market imperfection, the probability of a family remaining on a higher income trajectory
becomes higher. On the production side, I consider knowledge-based Aghion and Howitt
(1992) type of model, except that here I consider a more specific form of technology evo-
lution. That is, both imitation and innovation contribute toward technology improvement
depending on the distance of the economy to the frontier. In this case I assume that both
skilled and unskilled human capital are used as inputs in the R & D sector.3 The interac-
tions between production and consumption activities determine the optimal composition of
2Here unskilled human capital implies those individuals who have technical skill but do not acquire the
general purpose technology. In this entire synopsis I have used low skilled, technical skilled and unskilled
human capital as synonyms while on the other side skilled, high skilled and general skill human capital refer
to the same skill-set.
3Like Vandenbussche et al. (2006), Aghion and Howitt (2006), Aghion et al. (2009), Di Maria and
Stryszowski (2009) and Basu and Mehra (2014).
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skilled-unskilled human capital as well as economic growth, average income and consumption
of skilled and unskilled human capital of the aggregate economy, all of which are different
for different economies depending on their own technology level. Additionally, I also analyze
whether, in the long run, all the economies converge to the same steady state. Furthermore,
I characterize what happens to intergenerational upward or downward mobility of different
economies depending on their distance to the frontier? Moreover, I study the wage and
income inequality between skilled and unskilled human capital depending on its distance to
frontier. Along with that I look at the within skilled and unskilled group income inequality
due to parental income differences and due to differnece in the cognitive ability depeding on
their gap from world technology frontier.
In addition to the literature discussed so far, our work is also related to the earlier
literature in several respects. I first discuss the existing literature on inequality and in-
tergenerational mobility. Without considering that return to education changes over time,
under imperfect capital market Becker and Tomes (1997, 1986) and Loury (1981) show that
a more equal society leads to higher mobility and economic development. Becker and Tomes
(1986) also shows that intergenerational mobility is smaller when endowments are transferred
from parents to children. By considering macroeconomic dynamic, Borjas (1992) empirically
shows that the skill of today’s generation depends not only on parental income but also
on the average skills of the ethnic group in the parent’s generation. With perfect capital
market, Galor and Tsiddon (1997) shows that a major technological invention initially raises
inequality and consequently mobility. Over time, as technology becomes more accessible,
both mobility and inequality decrease. That is, there exists a positive relation between in-
equality and intergenerational mobility in the short run. But, with the assumption of capital
market imperfection, Owen and Weil (1998) and Moav and Moaz (1999) show that inequality
and mobility move in opposite directions.4 While Owen and Weil (1998) characterizes only
the steady state condition, Moav and Moaz (1999) charts out the transitional dynamics of
inequality, mobility and allocation of education along the growth path and shows that both
4For empirical support see Andrew and Leigh (2009).
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downward and upward mobility increases as an economy progresses. But none of these stud-
ies addresses the issue of technological progress over time and interaction of it with inequality
and mobility. Hassler et al. (2007) shows that difference in skill-biased technology or wage
compression exhibits a positive relation between inequality and mobility. This holds under
the assumption that poor parents not only have less ability to spend on children’s education
but also have a lower willingness to pay. Das (2007) shows that initial income differences
persist even under convex technology and convex preferences. Empirical findings of Solon
(1992) and Chadwick and Solon (2002) show that intergenerational correlation in the long
run income is relatively high for both son’s and daughter’s income.5 However, none of these
studies have considered the possibility of endogenous R & D based approach in the analysis
of intergenerational mobility and inequality. By incorporating this endogeneity along with
the concept of distance to frontier I propose to study the pattern of upward and downward
mobility of different generations and also the relationship between mobility and inequality
depending on the economy’s distance to frontier.
Our work also interfaces with the existing literature on convergence theory. Using the
classical approach Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991, 1992, 1995) and Sala-i-Martin (1994, 1996)
show that there exists cross-sectional conditional β-convergence even if σ-convergence is
not valid. But by using cointegration, Durlauf (1995) shows very little evidence of the
convergence of output. By criticizing the earlier methodology, Quah (1996a, 1996b, 1996c,
1996d, 1997), Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes (2004) and Maasoumia et al. (2007) empirically
show that income distribution is polarizing into twin peaks of rich and poor; that is, poor
are becoming poorer, rich are getting richer and middle class is diminishing. With the
assumption that an economy improves it technology level only through innovation, Howitt
(2000) theoretically demonstrates the possibility of club convergence. With nonparametric
analysis Mayer-Foulkes (2002) shows that, in the long run, the world income converges in
three steady states – semi-stagnation, semi-development and development, depending on
whether countries have overcome barriers to human capital and technological innovation.
5Also see Lee, solon (2009).
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By making the assumption that as technology level increases, innovation becomes more
difficult, Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes (2005) theoretically shows club convergence. Di-Maria
and Stryszowski (2009) and Basu and Mehra (2014) show that without any distortion, such
as migration, technology transfer from advanced economy leads to absolute convergence in
the long run.6
2 Economic Environment
2.1 Production
There are finite numbers of small open economies. In each economy there is an entrepreneur,
who is engaged in the production of a final output, and there are continuum of mass one
of intermediate input producers. Each intermediate input producer produces the monopoly
output, and invest their monopoly profit in the R & D activity. I assume free entry and exit
in the R & D sector.
I consider discrete time interval. Final output is produced competitively by using land
and a continuum of mass one of intermediate inputs. For simplicity I normalize the total
supply of land to one. I consider Cobb-Douglas production function of the form
Yt+1 = l
1−α
t+1
∫ 1
0
A1−αi,t+1x
α
i,t+1di, 0 < α < 1,
where, Yt+1 is the final output in period t + 1, lt+1 is the total amount of land, Ai,t+1 is the
technology level in sector i in period t+1 and xi,t+1 is the amount of intermediate input used
in sector i in period t+ 1.
Since the final good sector produces under perfect competition, price of each of the
intermediate input i is equal to its marginal product. That is,
pi,t+1 =
∂Yt+1
∂xi,t+1
= αA1−αi,t+1x
α−1
i,t+1,
where pi,t+1 denotes the price of the intermediate input in sector i in period t + 1. One
unit of the final good is required to produce one unit of intermediate input. The monopolist
6Aghion and Howitt (2006).
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chooses xi,t+1 by solving
max
xi,t+1
(pi,t+1xi,t+1 − xi,t+1).
The monopolist produces the following amount of the intermediate good in sector i in period
t+ 1
xi,t+1 = α
2
1−αAi,t+1
Profit of the intermediate input producer is
pii,t+1 = (pi,t+1 − 1)xi,t+1 =
(
1
α
− 1
)
α
2
1−αAi,t+1 = δ1Ai,t+1, (1)
where δ1 =
(
1
α
− 1)α 21−α .
Note that both the equilibrium level of production and the profit of the intermediate input
producers in sector i in period t+ 1 is linearly dependent on the local/ national technology
level in sector i in that period. That is, both the technology adjusted intermediate inputs
and the profit are same for all the sectors in every period.
2.2 Dynamics of Productivity
Technological progress depends not only on the innovation upon local/ national technology
level but also on the imitation of technology from the world technology frontier. This is in
similar line with Benhabib and Speigel (1994) and Acemoglu Aghion and Zilibott (2006).
However, in both of these two work technology improvement depends only on the total stock
of human capital and not on the composition of it. That is, whether skilled or unskilled
human capital are engaged in imitation or innovation activities that does not have any
impact on it. This is a rather restrictive assumption. So, I improve upon this by consider-
ing a specification similar to Vandenbussche, Aghion, Meghir (2006) and Aghion, Boustan,
Hoxby, Vandenbussche (2009) where imitation and innovation activities require both skilled
and unskilled human capital, but with differing intensity of use. I assume that innovation is
relatively skilled human capital intensive and imitation is unskilled human capital intensive.
A technologically backward (resp. advance) economy specializes in imitation (resp. inno-
6
vation) activity. The in between economies will perform both the activities.7 Now, I look
at the technology improvement specification of an economy which is in the imitation-only
regime.
2.2.1 Imitation-Only Regime
Ai,t+1 = Ai,t + λ
[
u˜σi,t+1s˜
1−σ
i,t+1
1
At+1
(At − At)
]
, λ > 0, (2)
where, u˜i,t+1 (resp. s˜i,t+1) measures the level of unskilled (resp. skilled) human capital engaged
in the imitation-only regime, σ is the elasticity of unskilled human capital in the imitation
activity and λ measures the efficiency of the overall technology improvement. (At − At)
captures the scope of imitation. Along with the advantage of backwardness, there is also a
disadvantage of backwardness, as mentioned by Gerschekron (1952). I divide the scope of
imitation also by its targeted world technology level, that is, At+1. That is, more advanced
the world leader, it is more difficult to imitate for a backward economy.
2.2.2 Imitation-Innovation Regime
Now, I discuss the technology improvement pattern of an economy which is in the imitation-
innovation regime. The specific technology improvement function is postulated as
Ai,t+1 = Ai,t + λ
[
uσmi,t+1s
1−σ
mi,t+1
1
At+1
(At − At) + γ uφni,t+1s1−φni,t+1At
]
, λ > 0, γ > 0, (3)
where, umi,t+1 (resp. smi,t+1) represents the amount of unskilled (resp. skilled) human capital
in the imitation activity, uni,t+1 (resp. sni,t+1) represents the amount of unskilled (resp. skilled)
human capital in the innovation activity, φ is the elasticity of unskilled human capital in the
innovation activity and γ measures the relative efficiency of innovation compare to imitation.
That is, in the diversified regime, an economy can improve its technology level through two
channels – imitation (that is, (At − At)) and innovation (that is, At).
7Later on in this work I show that this is true in equilibrium.
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2.2.3 Innovation-Only Regime
Ai,t+1 = Ai,t + λγÛ
φ
i,t+1Ŝ
1−φ
i,t+1At, λ > 0, γ > 0. (4)
In the innovation-only regime, an economy is so advanced that it increase its technology
through innovation only – how efficiently skilled and unskilled human capital innovates that
determine the next period technology level.8
To satisfy our basic assumption that innovation (resp. imitation) is relatively skilled
(resp. unskilled) human capital intensive than imitation (resp. innovation), I make the
following assumption:
A1. The elasticity of skilled human capital is higher in the innovation activity than in
the imitation activity, that is, σ > φ.
In the same vein, under the imitation-only regime, imitation is unskilled human capital
intensive implies σ > 1
2
and in the innovation-only regime, innovation is skilled human
capital intensive, that is, φ < 1
2
.9
A2. World technology frontier is growing at a constant exogenous rate g¯.
2.3 Consumption Side
I assume that an individual lives for two periods in an overlapping generation model. He/
she has a log-linear utility function. Utility depends on his/ her consumption in both the
periods and the level of bequest that he/ she leaves for his/ her child. In the first period
of his/ her life, an individual takes a decision on whether to opt for education or not. In
the second period, depending on his/ her education decision, he/ she works as a skilled/
unskilled worker. Like Moaz and Moav (1999) I assume complete absence of capital market.
So that individuals can not borrow or lend. That is, income and expenditure in the two
8Here efficiency or productivity of skilled and unskilled human capital is measured in terms of the elasticity
of skilled and unskilled human capital in the imitation and innovation activities.
9In the diversified regime our work does not require any assumption on the absolute intensity of skilled
or unskilled human capital in the imitation or innovation activities. hence, these parametric restrictions
pertain only to the specialized economies.
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periods are independent. An individual spends bequest on the first period consumption and
education (if he/ she opts for it) and allocates the second period income on his/ her own
consumption and leaves a bequest. I assume that individuals have different cognitive ability
(captured by parameter θ), which is uniformly distributed over the interval [0, 1]. The cost
of education is negatively related to the individual’s cognitive ability and positively with the
wage rate of unskilled human capital. That is,
E(θ, At−1) =
Hwut
θ
, (5)
where H is any positive constant. Both skilled and unskilled worker maximize his/ her
lifetime utility subject to the budget constraint. Each individual maximizes the following
lifetime utility function
Wk = ck,t,t
√
ck,t,t+1 xk,t,t+1, where k = s, u (6)
where Wk measures the lifetime utility of kth individual, ck,t,t is the consumption level of kth
individual in period t who born at period t, ck,t,t+1 is the consumption level of k
th individual
in period (t+ 1) who born at period t and xk,t,t+1 is level of bequest that k
th individual who
born at period t leaves for his/ her child at period (t+1). Budget constraint of skilled worker
who born at period t is
cs,t,t +
Hwut
θ
= xt,t
cs,t,t+1 + xs,t,t+1 = ws,t+1
Budget constraint of unskilled worker who born at period t is
cu,t,t = xt,t
cu,t,t+1 + xu,t,t+1 = wu,t+1
where ws,t+1 and wut+1 are respectively wage rate of skilled and unskilled worker at period
(t + 1), xt,t be the level of bequest that an individual received from his/ her parent. It
depends on whether his/ her parent was skilled or unskilled worker.
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I assume perfectly competitive labor markets. Individuals have perfect foresight. There
is no population growth. That is, each parent has one child. At the end of tth generation, a
new (t+ 1)th generation appears. This ensures mathematical tractability.
The interaction of production and consumption side determine the equilibrium composi-
tion of human capital. This in turn determines the allocation of skilled and unskilled human
capital between the imitation and innovation activities, which determines the overall tech-
nology improvement. Consequently, this ascertains the growth rate, convergence condition,
income, consumption, inequality and intergenerational mobility path of the economy as time
progresses.
3 Analytical Results
In this section I derive the main findings of our result.
3.1 Labour Supply
First, I look at the supply curve of an economy. As already mentioned income and consump-
tion in two periods are not interrelated. So, first I maximize second period utility function
w.r.t second period budget constraint.
Log-liner utility function ensures that an individual spends his/ her income equally on
second period consumption and bequest.10 Individual goes for education if his/ her lifetime
income as skilled worker is greater than unskilled worker. That is,11
Ws ≥Wu
⇒ θt+1 ≥ Hwut
xt,t
[
1− wu,t+1
ws,t+1
] (7)
That is, an individual goes for education if his/ her cognitive ability is higher than the as
mentioned in eq. (7). It depends on the future wage gap between skilled and unskilled
10Detailed Mathematical derivations are provided in eq. (A1) in the Appendix A.
11Detailed Mathematical derivations are provided in eq. (A2) in the Appendix A.
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human capital, level of bequest that an individual received from his/ her parent and also on
the cost of education. If an individual’s parent worked as skilled (resp. unskilled), he/she
leaves a higher (resp. lower) bequest, that is, wst
2
(resp. wut
2
). Therefore, the cutoff level
of cognitive ability above which an individual goes for education depends on whether his/
her parent was educated or not. Therefore, the total number of unskilled human capital in
period (t+ 1) is an weighted average of proportion of educated individuals in period (t+ 1)
whose parent was educated and also uneducated in period t.
θut+1 =
2H
1− wu,t+1
ws,t+1
and θst+1 =
2H xu,t
xs,t
1− wu,t+1
ws,t+1
(8)
where θut+1 (resp. θ
s
t+1) measures the cut off cognitive ability above which an individual goes
for education if his/ her parent was unskilled (resp. skilled). Note that θst+1 < θ
u
t+1. It implies
that child of an educated parent has higher opportunity of acquiring education than child of
an uneducated parent. So, education decision is not only correlated with the cognitive ability
of an individual but is also associated with the parental education decision and income. This
finding is in line with Galor and Moav (1999).
Ut+1 = θ
u
,t+1Ut + θ
s
t+1St =
2H
[
Ut +
xu,t
xs,t
St
]
1− wu,t+1
ws,t+1
(9)
That is, total number of unskilled (resp. skilled) human capital in period (t+ 1) depends on
the composition of human capital in period t and also on the expected future wage gap of
skilled and unskilled human capital. So, there is a trade off between history vs. expectation,
as mentioned in Krugman (1991).
3.2 Imitation-Only Regime
Now, I try to characterize the equilibrium findings of the economies which are in the
imitation-only regime. First, I illustrate the demand curve of skilled and unskilled human
capital in the imitation-only regime. After that I figure out the equilibrium level of skilled
and unskilled human capital. Subsequently I find the growth rate of an economy and the
wage path of skilled and unskilled human capital in the imitation-only regime.
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3.2.1 Demand for Skilled and Unskilled Human Capital
Now, let me look at the demand curve of skilled and unskilled human capital in the imitation-
only regime. Since an intermediate input producer operates the production process for one
period only, he/ she maximizes current profit net of labor costs. Profit maximizing exercise
of the intermediate input producer is
max
ui,t+1,si,t+1,
λδ1
[
U˜σi,t+1S˜
1−σ
i,t+1
1
At+1
(At − At)
]
−
[
wu,t+1U˜i,t+1 + ws,t+1S˜i,t+1
]
, (10)
where w˜i,t+1 =
[
wu,t+1U˜i,t+1 + ws,t+1S˜i,t+1
]
measures the total labor cost of R & D activity in
the imitation-only regime.
From eq. (10), I derive the first order condition of the maximization exercise of R & D
activity in the imitation-only regime
∂LM1,t+1
∂U˜i,t+1
= λδ1σU˜
σ−1
i,t+1 S˜
1−σ
i,t+1
1
At+1
(At − At)− wu,t+1 = 0;
∂LM1,t+1
∂S˜i,t+1
= λδ1(1− σ)U˜σi,t+1S˜−σi,t+1
1
At+1
(At − At)− ws,t+1 = 0. (11)
Now, let me look at the relative demand curve for skilled and unskilled human capital in the
imitation-only regime. From eq. (11), I get,
wu,t+1
ws,t+1
=
σ
(1− σ)
S˜i,t+1
U˜i,t+1
(12)
3.2.2 Equilibrium
Now, let me look at the equilibrium level of skilled and unskilled human capital in the the
imitation-only regime. Perfectly competitive labor market ensures that at a competitive
wage rate labor demand equates labor supply. Now, from eq. (9) and eq. (12), I get the
total number of unskilled human capital in the imitation-only regime:
U˜t+1 = σ + 2H (1− σ)
[
U˜t +
xu,t
xs,t
S˜t
]
(13)
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(a) Skilled and Unskilled Human Capital (b) Growth Rate
Figure 1: Imitation Only – Composition of Skilled and Unskilled Human Capital and Growth
Rate
Now, from eq. (13), I get the total number of skilled human capital in the imitation-only
regime:
S˜t+1 = 1− U˜t+1 = (1− σ)
[
1− 2H
[
U˜t +
xu,t
xs,t
S˜t
]]
(14)
To ensure the essentiality of inputs I need the following condition:
S˜t+1 > 0 ⇒ H < 1
2
[
U˜t +
xu,t
xs,t
S˜t
]
To do the comparative static analysis, I use simulation. The arbitrary parametric values are
[λ, δ, γ, σ, φ, H, g¯, A1]= [0.4, 0.6, 0.1, 0.6, 0.15, 0.1, 0.02, 10]. Now, I give the specific
arbitrary parametric values of the imitation-only regime. That is, [U(1), a(1)]=[0.8, 0.01]
From fig. (1a), one can see that equilibrium level of unskilled human capital is higher than
skilled human capital in the imitation-only regime. After initial adjustment there exists a
constant composition of human capital.
3.2.3 Growth Rate
Now, I characterize the growth rate of an economy in the imitation-only regime. From eq.
(2), I get,
g˜t+1 =
∫ 1
0
Ai,t+1 −Ai,t
Ait
di =
λ
(1 + g¯)At
U˜σt+1S˜
(1−σ)
t+1
(1− at)
at
, (15)
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(a) Wage Rate (b) Between Group Wage Inequality
Figure 2: Imitation-Only Regime – Wage Rate and Between Group Wage Inequality of
Skilled-Unskilled Human Capital
where, g˜t+1 measures the growth rate of an economy in period t+1. Now, I do the comparative
static analysis. First, I would like to study the transition path of an economy. As relative
gap of an economy from the world technology frontier decreases, scope of imitation decreases.
As a consequence of which increment of technology is lower in the imitation-only regime and
that leads to a lower growth rate, as observed in fig. (1b).
3.2.4 Wage Rate
Now I want to study the wage path of skilled and unskilled human capital in the imitation-
only regime as an economy progresses. Also I would like to study the relative wage gap
between skilled and unskilled human capital. From eq. (11) and eq. (13), I get,
w˜u,t+1 = λδ1
σ(1− σ)(1−σ)
(1 + g¯)
[
1− 2H
[
S˜t +
xs,t
xu,t
U˜t
]](1−σ)
[
σ + 2H (1− σ)
[
S˜t +
xs,t
xu,t
U˜t
]](1−σ) (1− at)
w˜s,t+1 = λδ1
(1− σ)(1−σ)
(1 + g¯)
[
1− 2H
[
S˜t +
xs,t
xu,t
U˜t
]]−σ
[
σ + 2H (1− σ)
[
S˜t +
xs,t
xu,t
U˜t
]]−σ (1− at)
Form fig. (2a), as an economy progresses, scope of imitation falls, consequently marginal
productivity of skilled and unskilled human capital falls and so does the wage rate falls. Now,
the question is, what happens to the relative wage gap between skilled and unskilled human
capital in the imitation-only regime. From fig. (2b), it is clear that, after initial adjustment,
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there exists a constant level of wage inequality between skilled and unskilled human capital
in the imitation-only regime.
3.3 Innovation-Only Regime
Now, our focus of study is the innovation-only regime. In this subsection, I derive the
equilibrium outcome of skilled and unskilled human capital in the innovation-only regime.
Consequently that decides the growth rate of the economy. Furthermore, I study wage path
of an economy which is in the innovation-only regime.
3.3.1 Demand for Skilled and Unskilled Human Capital
First, I examine the demand curve of skilled and unskilled human capital. Let me look at
the maximization exercise of the R & D activity of the intermediate input producers in the
innovation-only regime.
max
Ûi,t+1,Ŝi,t+1,
λγδ1Û
φ
i,t+1Ŝ
1−φ
i,t+1At −
[
wu,t+1Ûi,t+1 + ws,t+1Ŝi,t+1
]
,
where ŵi,t+1 =
[
wu,t+1Ûi,t+1 + ws,t+1Ŝi,t+1
]
measures the cost associated with the R & D activity
of an intermediate input producer who is in the innovation-only regime.
The first order condition of maximization exercise of the innovation-only regime is
∂LN1,t+1
∂Ûi,t+1
= λδ1γφÛ
φ−1
i,t+1 Ŝ
1−φ
i,t+1At − wu,t+1 = 0;
∂LN1,t+1
∂Ŝi,t+1
= λγδ1(1− φ)Ûσi,t+1Ŝ−φi,t+1At − ws,t+1 = 0. (16)
From eq. (16), I derive the relative demand for skilled-unskilled human capital in the
innovation-only regime is
wu,t+1
ws,t+1
=
φ
(1− φ)
Ŝi,t+1
Ûi,t+1
(17)
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3.3.2 Equilibrium
Now, I look at the equilibrium level of skilled and unskilled human capital in the innovation-
only regime. From eq. (9) and eq. (17), I get,
Ût+1 = φ+ 2H (1− φ)
[
Ût +
xu,t
xs,t
Ŝt
]
;
Ŝt+1 = (1− φ)
[
1− 2H
(
Ût +
xu,t
xs,t
Ŝt
)]
. (18)
Similar to the imitation-only regime, here also stock of skilled and unskilled human capital
in period (t + 1) is history dependent. From fig. (3a), total stock of skilled human capital
is higher than the unskilled human capital in the innovation-only regime. The specific
parametric values for the innovation-only regime are [U(1), a(1)]=[0.3, 0.6].
Now, regularity condition for positive stock of skilled and unskilled human capital is the
following
Now, Ŝt+1 > 0 ⇒ H < 1
2
[
Ût +
xu,t
xs,t
Ŝt
]
Now, let me focus on the relative amount of skilled and unskilled human capital in the
innovation-only regime. From eq. (18), I get,
Ŝt+1
Ût+1
=
(1− φ)
[
1− 2H
(
Ût +
xu,t
xs,t
Ŝt
)]
φ+ 2H (1− φ)
(
Ût +
xu,t
xs,t
Ŝt
) (19)
From eq. (17) and (19), I get the relative wage rate of unskilled and skilled human capital.
That is,
wu,t+1
ws,t+1
=
φ
(1− φ)
Ŝt+1
Ût+1
=
φ
[
1− 2H
[
Ût +
xu,t
xs,t
Ŝt
]]
φ+ 2H (1− φ)
[
Ût +
xu,t
xs,t
Ŝt
]
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(a) Skilled and Unskilled Human Capital (b) Growth Rate
Figure 3: Innovation Only – Composition of Skilled and Unskilled Human Capital and
Growth Rate
(a) Wage Rate (b) Between Group wage Inequality
Figure 4: Innovation Only – Wage Rate and Wage Inequality between Skilled and Unskilled
Human Capital
3.3.3 Growth Rate
Now, let me talk about the growth rate of an economy in the innovation-only regime.
ĝt+1 = λγÛ
φ
t+1Ŝ
(1−φ)
t+1
= λγ(1− φ)(1−φ)
[
1− 2H
[
Ût +
xu,t
xs,t
Ŝt
]](1−φ) [
φ+ 2H (1− φ)
[
Ût +
xu,t
xs,t
Ŝt
]]φ
[Using eq.(18)] (20)
It depends on the composition of human capital. So, it is also history dependent. From fig. (3b),
after initial adjustment there exists a constant level of growth rate in the innovation-only regime.
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3.3.4 Wage Rate
Now, I discuss the wage path of skilled and unskilled human capital as an economy progresses.
From eq. (16), I get,
ŵu,t+1 = λδ1φÛ
φ−1
t+1 Ŝ
1−φ
t+1 atAt; ŵs,t+1 = λδ1(1− φ)Ûφt+1Ŝ−σt+1atAt
As an economy progresses, technology level increases, which entails an increment in efficiency of the
innovation activity. That raises marginal productivity of skilled and unskilled human capital and
consequently raises wage rate of skilled and unskilled human capital as illustrate in fig. (4a). Now,
the question is what happens to the relative wage gap of skilled and unskilled human capital. After
initial adjustment there exists a constant level of wage inequality in the innovation-only regime, as
shown in fig. (4b).
3.4 Imitation-Innovation Regime
In this subsection, first, I find out the demand curve for skilled and unskilled human capital and
also demand for those in the imitation and in the innovation activity. Subsequently, I figure out
the equilibrium allocation of those in these two activities. Also, I get the growth rate and wage
path of skilled and unskilled human capital of an economy which is in the diversified regime.
3.4.1 Demand for Skilled and Unskilled Human Capital
First, look at the demand curve of skilled and unskilled human capital in the diversified regime.
Maximization exercise of the intermediate input producer in the diversified regime is
max
umi,t+1,uni,t+1,smi,t+1,sni,t+1
λδ1
[
uσmi,t+1s
1−σ
mi,t+1
1
At+1
(At −At) + γuφni,t+1s1−φni,t+1At
]
− [wu,t+1(umi,t+1 + uni,t+1) + ws,t+1(smi,t+1 + sni,t+1)] . (21)
where wi,t+1 = [wu,t+1(umi,t+1 + uni,t+1) + ws,t+1(smi,t+1 + sni,t+1)] measures the labor cost of R & D
activity in the diversified regime.
Now, I derive the first order maximizing condition of the R & D activity in the imitation-
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innovation regime. From eq. (21), I get,
∂L1,t+1
∂umi,t+1
= λδ1σu
σ−1
mi,t+1s
1−σ
mi,t+1
1
At+1
(At −At)− wu,t+1 = 0;
∂L1,t+1
∂uni,t+1
= λδ1γφu
φ−1
ni,t+1s
1−φ
ni,t+1At − wu,t+1 = 0;
∂L1,t+1
∂smi,t+1
= λδ1(1− σ)uσmi,t+1s−σmi,t+1
1
At+1
(At −At)− ws,t+1 = 0;
∂L1,t+1
∂sni,t+1
= λδ1γ(1− φ)uφni,t+1s−φni,t+1At − ws,t+1 = 0. (22)
Given that all intermediate producers face the same maximization problem, in equilibrium I have
umi,t+1 = um,t+1, uni,t+1 = un,t+1, smi,t+1 = sm,t+1, sni,t+1 = sn,t+1. (23)
There is mass 1 of intermediate firms, so that labor market equilibrium condition is
St+1 = sm,t+1 + sn,t+1, Ut+1 = um,t+1 + un,t+1. (24)
From the first order condition in eq. (22) and using eq. (23), I get the relative demand curves for
skilled and unskilled human capital in the imitation and innovation activities respectively. That is,
ws,t+1
wu,t+1
=
(1− σ)
σ
um,t+1
sm,t+1
;
ws,t+1
wu,t+1
=
(1− φ)
φ
un,t+1
sn,t+1
. (25)
Equalization of the relative wage rate in eq. (25) implies:
ψ
sm,t+1
um,t+1
=
sn,t+1
un,t+1
, (26)
where, ψ = σ(1−φ)φ(1−σ) > 1, by A1.
Demand for skilled and unskilled human capital in the imitation and innovation activities are12
sn,t+1 =
ψ St+1 − h(at) Ut+1
ψ − 1 ; sm,t+1 =
h(at) Ut+1 − St+1
ψ − 1 ;
un,t+1 =
ψSt+1 − h(at) Ut+1
(ψ − 1) h(at) ; um,t+1 =
ψ[h(at) Ut+1 − St+1]
(ψ − 1) h(at) . (27)
where h(at) =
[
(1−σ)ψσ(1−at)
γ(1−φ)(1+g¯)Atat
] 1
(σ−φ)
.
Now, I find out the relative demand for skilled and unskilled human capital in the imitation
and in the innovation activity. From eq. (27), I get,
sm,t+1
um,t+1
=
h(at)
ψ
;
sn,t+1
un,t+1
= h(at). (28)
12Detailed mathematical derivations are provided in eqs. (D1-D3) in the Appendix D.
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3.4.2 Equilibrium
Now, equating the demand and supply curve of skilled and unskilled human capital, I get the
equilibrium level of skilled and unskilled human capital in the diversified regime. Also, I derive the
equilibrium allocation of skilled and unskilled human capital in the imitation-innovation regime.
First I obtain the cutoff level of cognitive ability above which an individual goes for education
given that his/ her parent was educated or not. Now, substituting eq. (25) and eq. (28) in eq. (8),
I get,
θut+1 =
2H
1− φ(1−φ)h(at)
; θst+1 =
2H
xu,t
xs,t
1− φ(1−φ)h(at)
. (29)
Now, from eq. (29), I get the total number of unskilled human capital in the imitation-innovation
regime
Ut+1 = θ
s
t+1St + θ
u
t+1Ut =
2H(1− φ)
[
Ut +
xut
xst
St
]
[(1− φ)− φh(at)] (30)
Now, I find out the equilibrium level of skilled human capital in the imitation-innovation regime.
From eq. (30), I get,
St+1 = 1− Ut+1 = 1−
2H(1− φ)
[
Ut +
xut
xst
St
]
[(1− φ)− φh(at)] (31)
For essentiality of both the inputs I need the following conditions:
Ut+1 > 0 ⇒ [(1− φ)− φh(at)] > 0
St+1 > 0 ⇒ 1−
2H(1− φ)
[
Ut +
xut
xst
St
]
[(1− φ)− φh(at)] > 0 ⇒ H <
[(1− φ)− φh(at)]
2(1− φ)
[
Ut +
xut
xst
St
]
Now, I do some comparative static analysis. I look at the change in the total stock of skilled and
unskilled human capital as an economy progresses. Catch-up component being higher for a tech-
nologically backward economy. As an economy progresses relative gap from the world technology
frontier decreases. As an outcome of which relative importance of the imitation activity decreases
and the innovation activity increases. From A1, unskilled human capital is more efficient in imi-
tation than innovation activity. Therefore, in equilibrium total number of unskilled human capital
falls and skilled human capital rises as an economy progresses, which is also examined in fig. (5a).
That is, ∂ Ut+1∂ at < 0 and
∂ St+1
∂ at
> 0.
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(a) (b)
Figure 5: Diversified Regime – Skilled-Unskilled Human Capital and Allocation of it Imita-
tion and Innovation Activities
Lemma 1
Under A1,
In the imitation-only regime equilibrium level of unskilled human capital is higher than the
equilibrium level of skilled human capital. Also, after initial adjustment there exists a constant
composition of skilled and unskilled human capital.
Similar to Imitation-only regime, in the innovation-only regime also there exists a constant
composition of skilled and unskilled human capital, after initial adjustment. But, the equilibrium
level of skilled human capital is higher than the equilibrium level of unskilled human capital in the
innovation-only regime.
The stock of skilled human capital increases and unskilled human capital decreases as a country
moves to the the world technology frontier, for the country which is in the imitation-innovation
regime.
From eq. (27), eq. (30) and eq. (31), I get the equilibrium allocation of skilled and unskilled
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human capital in the imitation and in the innovation activities.
sm,t+1 =
2 H (1− φ)[1 + h(at)]
[
Ut +
xut
xst
St
]
(ψ − 1) [(1− φ)− φh(at)] −
1
(ψ − 1)
um,t+1 =
2 H ψ (1− φ)[1 + h(at)]
[
Ut +
xut
xst
Ut
]
(ψ − 1)h(at) [(1− φ)− φh(at)] −
ψ
(ψ − 1) h(at)
sn,t+1 =
ψ
(ψ − 1) −
2 H (1− φ)
[
Ut +
xut
xst
St
]
[ψ + h(at)]
(ψ − 1) [(1− φ)− φh(at)]
un,t+1 =
ψ
(ψ − 1)h(at) −
2 H (1− φ)
[
Ut +
xut
xst
St
]
[ψ + h(at)]
(ψ − 1) h(at) [(1− φ)− φh(at)] (32)
Now, let me look at the comparative dynamics. First I discuss the change in the allocation of skilled
and unskilled human capital in the imitation and innovation activity as an economy progresses.
By Lemma 1, total stock of skilled (resp. unskilled) human capital increases (resp. decreases).
By A1, innovation is more skilled intensive. Therefore, innovation attracts more skilled human
capital than imitation as gap from the world technology frontier falls. Due to complementary effect
unskilled human capital also shifts from the imitation to the innovation activity. This attracts
more skilled human capital and so on. Therefore, in equilibrium total stock of skilled and unskilled
human capital increases in the innovation activity and decreases in the imitation activity, as shown
in fig. (5b). That is,
d sm,t+1
d at
< 0,
d um,t+1
d at
< 0,
d sn,t+1
d at
> 0 and
d un,t+1
d at
> 0.
Lemma 2
Under A1,
The stock of both skilled and unskilled human capital shifts from the imitation activity to the
innovation activity as an economy bridges gap from the world technology frontier in the imitation-
innovation regime.
Now, I discuss the regularity condition for the existence of the positive amount of skilled and
unskilled human capital in the imitation and in the innovation activity. That is, sm,t+1 > 0,
sm,t+1 < St+1, sn,t+1 > 0, sn,t+1 < St+1, um,t+1 > 0, um,t+1 < Ut+1, un,t+1 > 0 and un,t+1 < Ut+1. The
regularity condition is
[(1− φ)− φh(at)]
2 (1− φ) [1 + h(at)]
[
St +
xst
xut
Ut
] < H < ψ [(1− φ)− φ h(at)]
2 (1− φ)[ψ + h(at)]
[
St +
xst
xut
Ut
] . (33)
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(a) Growth Rate (b) Wage Rate
Figure 6: Diversified Regime – Growth Rate and Wage Rate of Skilled and Unskilled Human
Capital
3.4.3 Growth Rate
Now, I try to figure out the growth rate of an economy in the diversified regime. From eq. (3), I
get,13
gt+1 = λ
[
uσm,t+1 s
1−σ
m,t+1
1
At+1
(
1− at
at
)
+ γ uφn,t+1s
1−φ
n,t+1
]
= λ
[(
um,t+1
sm,t+1
)σ sm,t+1
At+1
(1− at)
at
+ γ
(
un,t+1
sn,t+1
)φ
sn,t+1
]
= λ γ(1− φ) h−φ(at)
[
1− 2H
(
St +
xst
xut
Ut
)]
. (34)
Growth rate of an economy in the diversified regime depends on the relative intensity of skilled
and unskilled human capital, allocation of skilled human capital on these two activities and the
distance of an economy from the world technology frontier. From eq. (28) and (D4), I get that
relative intensity of skilled-unskilled human capital depends positively w.r.t distance to frontier.
Allocation of skilled human capital in the imitation (resp. innovation) activity depends negatively
(resp. positively) on distance to frontier. Obviously, the relative gap from frontier decreases as an
economy progresses. Now, I want to study the growth rate of an economy as an economy bridging
the gap from the world technology frontier. From fig. (6a), I get, growth rate initially falls and after
that increases as an economy progresses. That is, I get a U-shaped growth curve in the diversified
regime.
13Detailed mathematical derivations are provided in eq. (D5) in the Appendix C.
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Proposition 1
Under A1,
In the imitation-only regime, growth rate falls as an economy progresses.
In the Diversified regime, growth rate initially falls and after that rises as an economy progresses.
That is, there exists an U-shaped growth path in the diversified regime.
In the long-run there exists constant growth rate in the innovation-only regime.
3.4.4 Wage Rate
Now, let me talk about the dynamic path of the wage rate of skilled and unskilled human capital
as an economy bridges gap from the world frontier. Substituting eq. (28) in eq. (22), I get,
wu, t+1 = λδ1γφh
1−φ(at)atAt; ws, t+1 = λδ1γ(1− φ)h−φ(at)atAt.
In the diversified regime, as an economy progresses relative importance of innovation (resp. imita-
tion) increases (resp. decreases). From A1, marginal productivity of skilled human capital increases
and unskilled human capital decreases and so does the wage rate of skilled human capital rises and
unskilled human capital falls. Consequently, wage gap between skilled and unskilled human capital
increases, as demonstrated in fig. (6b).
3.5 Steady State
In this subsection I look at the long run equilibrium condition of an economy. That is, as time
progresses whether an economy converges its gap from the world technology frontier, depending on
its distance to frontier. From the very definition of growth rate, I know that,
gt+1 =
At+1 −At
At
=
At+1
At
− 1 = At+1
At+1
At
At
(1 + g¯)− 1 = at+1(1 + g¯)
at
− 1
at+1 =
(1 + gt+1)
(1 + g¯)
at (35)
That is, if growth rate of an economy be higher that the growth rate of the world leader, then the
economy will be able to converge its gap from the frontier. In the long run, it will catch up with
the frontier technology level. From fig. (7a), fig. (7c) and fig. (7b), it is clear that as an economy
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(a) Imitation-only Regime (b) Innovation-only Regime
(c) Diversified Regime
Figure 7: Steady State
progresses it is converge its distance from the world technology frontier. In the long run all the
economies will converge to the same technology level.
In the stead state at will converge to a
∗, that is, at → a∗ and growth rate of the economy will
converge to g∗, that is, gt → g∗. Therefore, from eq. (35), I get that either g∗ = g¯ or a∗ = 0.
That is, in the long run all the economies will grow at the same rate. That is, there exists absolute
convergence of the economies in the long run.
Proposition 2
In the long-run all the economies will converge to the world technology frontier irrespective of
its distance to frontier. Moreover, in the steady state all the economies will grow at the same rate.
3.6 Intergenerational Mobility
In this subsection, I look at the upward and downward mobility of individuals as an economy
progresses. Upward mobility implies that an individual works as a skilled worker given that his/
her parent was unskilled. That is,
UMt+1 = Ut(1− θut+1), (36)
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(a) Imitation-only Regime (b) Innovation-Only Regime
(c) Diversified Regime
Figure 8: Upward and Downward Mobility
where, UMt+1 measures upward mobility in period (t+ 1). It captures the chance of moving from
low equilibrium to high equilibrium. Whereas downward mobility implies that parent was skilled
but child is working as an unskilled worker. That is,
DMt+1 = Stθ
s
t+1, (37)
where DMt+1 measures downward mobility in period (t+1). Intergenerational mobility helps me to
capture the correlation between cognitive ability and income of an individual. Low mobility implies
that income of an individual is less correlated with the cognitive ability and highly correlated with
the parental income. From fig. (8a) and fig. (8b), I get that after initial adjustment there exists a
constant level of upward and downward mobility in the imitation-only and in the innovation-only
regimes.
Now, I look at the dynamic path of upward and dowanward mobility in the diversified regime.
From fig. (6b), I know that in the diversified regime, wage gap between skilled and unskilled
human capital rises as an economy progresses. This implies that, individual’s whose parents are
unskilled (resp. skilled) leave less (resp. more) bequest. As a result of which chance of becoming
educated falls (resp. rises) for them. Subsequently, upward (resp. downward) mobility falls as an
economy progresses. From fig. (8c), one can verify that, as an economy progresses both upward
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(a) Average Income of Skilled (b) Average Income of Unskilled
Figure 9: Imitation only Regime – Average Income of Skilled and Unskilled Human Capital
and downward mobility falls. That is, as gap from the world frontier falls chance of shifting from
low equilibrium to high equilibrium falls. Also, the chance of moving from high equilibrium to low
equilibrium falls as an economy progresses. That is, if parent was educated then chance of being
educated rises and if parent was unskilled then opportunity of becoming educated falls. That is,
education becomes more correlated with the parental income and less related with the cognitive
ability.
Proposition 3
Under A1,
In the imitation-only and innovation-only regimes, there exists a constant level of upward and
downward mobility as an economy progresses.
In the Diversified regime, upward mobility and downward mobility falls as an economy pro-
gresses.
3.7 Income Inequality
In this subsection, first I find out the average income of skilled and unskilled human capital. Also, I
derive the income inequality between skilled and unskilled human capital. Furthermore, I also work
out the within skilled and unskilled group income inequality due to parental income differences.
Moreover, I figure out the within skilled group welfare gap due to difference in the cognitive ability
among individual’s. Now, from eq. (6), I define the income of skilled and unskilled human capital
depending on his/ her parental education status. Average income an individual depends his/ her
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(a) Average Income of Skilled (b) Average Income of Unskilled
Figure 10: Innovation only – Average Income of Skilled and Unskilled Human Capital
education level and the level of bequest that he/ she gets from his/ her parent.
Isst+1 =
[
wst
2
− H wut
2
− H wut
2 θst+1
]
+ wst+1;
Isut+1 =
[
wut
2
− H wu(t)
2
− H wut
2 θut+1
]
+ wst+1;
Imet+1 =
wst
2
+ wut+1; I
uu
t+1 =
wut
2
+ wut+1;
I
s
t+1 =
(1− θst+1)Isst+1 + (1− θut+1)Isut+1
(1− θst+1) + (1− θut+1)
; I
u
t+1 =
θst+1I
me
t+1 + θ
u
t+1I
uu
t+1
θst+1 + θ
u
t+1
; (38)
where, Isst+1 (resp. I
su
t+1) measures the income of skilled human capital if parent was skilled (resp.
unskilled) and Imet+1 (resp. I
uu
t+1) measures the income of unskilled human capital if parent was
skilled (resp. unskilled). I
s
t+1 (resp. I
u
t+1) measures the average income of skilled (resp. unskilled)
human capital. That is, average income of skilled (resp. unskilled) is the weighted average of the
income of skilled (resp. unskilled) whose parent was skilled and whose parent was unskilled. From
fig. (9a) and (9b), I show that average income of skilled and unskilled human capital falls as an
economy progresses in the imitation-only regime. Whereas from fig. (10a) and fig. (resp. (10b), I
get that average income of skilled and unskilled human capital rises as an economy progresses in
the innovation-only regime. Moreover, in the diversified regime, average income of skilled human
capital rises and unskilled human capital falls as gap from the world technology frontier falls, as
shown in fig. (11a) and fig. (11b). That is, between skilled and unskilled group income inequality
rises. That is, income path of skilled and unskilled human capital follows the same pattern as like
the wage path of skilled and unskilled human capital in all the three regimes.
Now, I define the income inequality within skilled and unskilled human capital. First, I figure
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(a) Average Income of Skilled (b) Average Income of Unskilled
Figure 11: Diversified Regime – Average Income of Skilled and Unskilled Human Capital
(a) Due to Parental Income Differences (b) Due to Cognitive Ability Difference
Figure 12: Imitation only Regime – Income Inequality with in Skilled and Unskilled Human
Capital
out the income inequality due to the parental income differences.
Iinst+1 =
Isst+1
Isut+1
; Iinut+1 =
Imet+1
Iuut+1
, (39)
where Iinst+1 (resp. Iin
u
t+1) measures the income inequality within skilled (resp. unskilled) human
capital due to difference in the parental education level. In the imitation-only and innovation-only
regimes, there exists a constant level of income inequality within skilled and unskilled human capital
due to parental income differences. Income inequality within unskilled human capital is higher than
skilled human capital, as shown in fig. (12a) and fig. (13a). Whereas, in the diversified regime,
due to parental income differences within skilled and unskilled human capital income inequality
rises as an economy progresses, as illustrated in fig. (14a). As an economy moves toward the world
technology frontier, as mentioned in fig. (6b), wage gap between skilled and unskilled human capital
rises. Therefore, the gap between the level of bequest that a skilled (resp. unskilled) individual
29
(a) Due to Parental Income Differences (b) Due to Cognitive Ability Differences
Figure 13: Innovation only Regime – Income Inequality with in Skilled and Unskilled Human
Capital
(a) Due to Parental Income Differences (b) Due to Cognitive Ability Differences
Figure 14: Diversified Regime – Income Inequality with in Skilled and Unskilled Human
Capital
gets from his/ her parent due to the difference in the parental income level rises. This leads to
a higher income inequality within skilled (resp. unskilled) human capital due to difference in the
parental income.
Now, I illustrate the income inequality among skilled human capital due to differences in the
cognitive ability.
Iinθst+1 =
Isst+1|θ=1
Isst+1|θ=θs
; Iinθut+1 =
Isut+1|θ=1
Isut+1|θ=θu
, (40)
where Iinθst+1 (resp. Iin
θs
t+1) measures the income inequality due to the cognitive ability differences
among skilled human capital even if their parents are skilled (resp. unskilled). That is, it measures
the income gap of skilled human capital with highest and lowest cognitive ability. Also, all of their
parents have the same income level, since all of them were educated (resp. uneducated). There also
exists constant level of inequality within skilled human capital due to difference in cognitive ability
in the imitation-only and innovation-only regime. This is true for both the cases – where parents
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were either skilled or unskilled, as shown in fig. (12b) and fig. (13b). In the imitation-innovation
regime, due to difference in cognitive ability, income inequality within skilled human capital rises
irrespective of their parent’s education status as an economy progresses, as depicted in fig. (14b).
By Lemma1, as an economy progresses skilled human rises in the diversified regime. That is,
individual’s with relative low cognitive ability now become educated. As a result of which of cost
gap among the skilled human capital rises irrespective of their parental income level. This leads to
a higher income inequality within skilled human capital due to difference in cognitive ability.
Proposition 4
Under A1,
In the imitation-only regime, wage rate and average income of skilled and unskilled human
capital falls as an economy progresses. There exists a constant level of wage and income inequality
between skilled and unskilled group.
In the Diversified regime, wage rate and average income of skilled human capital rises and
unskilled human capital falls as an economy steps forward to the world frontier. Wage inequality
and income inequality between skilled and unskilled human capital rises as an economy bridges the
gap from the world technology frontier.
In the innovation-only regime, wage rate and average income of skilled and unskilled human
capital rises as an economy progresses. There exists a constant level of wage and income inequality
between skilled and unskilled human capital.
In the imitation-only and in the innovation-only regimes, there exists constant level of income
inequality within skilled and unskilled human capital due to parental income differences. Whereas
there exists constant level of income inequality within skilled human capital due to cognitive ability
differences, in the imitation-only and innovation-only regimes.
In the imitation-innovation regime, income inequality within skilled and unskilled human capital
rises due to parental income differences. Moreover, income inequality within skilled human capital
rises due to cognitive ability differences.
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(a) Unskilled Human Capital (b) Growth Rate
Figure 15: Imitation-Only Regime– Comparative Static wrt Cost of Education
(a) Unskilled Human Capital (b) Growth Rate
Figure 16: Innovation-Only Regime– Comparative Static wrt Cost of Education
3.8 Cost of Education
In this subsection, I do some comparative static analysis. Our main focus is to look at the impact
of an increment in the cost of education on the composition of human capital and also on the
growth rate of an economy. As cost of education increases, income of an individual who works as
a skilled worker decreases whereas income as an unskilled worker remains unchanged. Therefore,
increment in cost of education reduces total stock of skilled human capital and increases unskilled
human capital, irrespective of its distance to frontier, as shown in fig. (15a), in fig. (16a) and in
fig. (17a). As an outcome of which growth rate also falls in the innovation-only regime, as cost
of education rises, as illustrated in fig. (16b). This in turn implies that skilled human capital is
growth enhancing in the innovation-only regime.
Now, I talk about the impact of higher cost of education in the allocation of skilled and unskilled
human capital in the imitation and in the innovation activities. By A1, both skilled and unskilled
human capital shifts from innovation to imitation activity and consequently growth rate falls as
cost of education rises, as shown in fig. (17b), in fig. (18a) and in fig. (18b). That is, skilled human
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(a) Unskilled Human Capital (b) Skilled in Imitation
Figure 17: Diversified Regime– Comparative Static wrt Cost of Education
(a) Unskilled in Innovation (b) Growth Rate
Figure 18: Diversified Regime– Comparative Static wrt Cost of Education
capital is growth enhancing in the imitation-innovation regime.
4 Conclusion
Technological progress is a dual phenomenon. A country can improve its technology level by imi-
tating from the frontier or by innovating new knowledge. An economy which is lagging far behind
the world technology frontier can improve its technology level by allocating its labor force mainly
into imitation. Similarly, an advanced economy can progress technologically by innovating new
knowledge. Under the assumption that different types of human capital are efficient in different
activities, Vandenbussche, Aghion and Meghir (2006), Aghion, Boustan, Hoxby and Vandenbussche
(2009) and Basu and Mehra (2014) show that unskilled human capital is the main source of growth
for the technologically backward economy and skilled human capital is the main source of growth
for the technologically advanced economy. Now, by utilizing an endogenous growth model, with
complete absence of credit market I show that growth maximizing level of skilled and unskilled hu-
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man capital is different for economies depending on its distance from the world technology frontier.
Moreover, in the diversified regime opportunity of becoming rich (resp. poor) given that parent was
rich (resp. poor) rises as an economy progresses. That is, as an economy progresses, correlation
between income and cognitive ability falls. Also, between and within skilled and unskilled group
income inequality rises in the diversified regime as an economy bridges its gap from the frontier.
Our work can be extended in several directions. First, one can allow the possibility of outsourc-
ing of the R and D activity by a developed economy to a less developed economy. Wage rate of
skilled human capital is relatively lower and the average cognitive ability of skilled human capital
is higher in the less developed economy. This increases the profit of the R and D producer in the
developed economy and also raises the income of skilled and unskilled human capital in the under-
developed economy. Second, in this entire work, I assume that new knowledge is freely available to
all the economies. Instead, one can characterize the growth path and the convergence condition of
the economy by ruling out the assumption that world technology level is freely accessible. Third,
till now all the work in this area has abstracted from international trade in commodities. One can
develop a dynamic Ricardian model of international trade around the core idea of our work and
can study cross-sectoral allocation of skilled and unskilled human capital in the context of inter-
national specialization in goods production and trade. Forth, one can analyze the consequences of
heterogeneous cost of education depending on his/ her parental education level and can study the
impact of that on growth rate, inequality and intergenerational mobility of an economy depending
on its distance to frontier. This would certainly yield further insights on the relationship between
distance to frontier and composition of human capital and economic growth.
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Appendix A
Maximization exercise of an individual
Lk =
√
ck,t,t+1 xk,t,t+1 + µ[wk,t+1 − ck,t,t+1 − xk,t,t+1];
∂Lk
∂ck,t,t+1
=
1
2
√
xk,t,t+1
ck,t,t+1
− µ = 0;
∂Lk
∂xk,t,t+1
=
1
2
√
ck,t,t+1
xk,t,t+1
− µ = 0;
∂Lk
∂xk,t,t+1
= wk,t+1 − ck,t,t+1 − xk,t,t+1 = 0
⇒ ck,t,t+1 = xk,t,t+1 = wk,t+1
2
(A1)
Education decision of an individual
Ws ≥Wu
⇒
[
xt,t − Hwut
θ
]
ws,t+1
2
≥ xt,twu,t+1
2
[Using eq.(6)]
⇒ θt+1 ≥ Hwut
xt,t
[
1−
(
wu,t+1
ws,t+1
)] (A2)
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Appendix C
Change in the relative stock of skilled-unskilled human capital w.r.t
skilled
let, z =
S˜t+1
U˜t+1
⇒ lnz = lnS˜t+1 − lnU˜t+1
⇒ 1
z
d z
d S˜t+1
=
1
S˜t+1
+
1
U˜t+1
=
1
S˜t+1U˜t+1
⇒ d z
d S˜t+1
=
1
U˜2t+1
⇒ d S˜t+1
d S˜t+1
U˜t+1
= U˜2t+1 (C1)
Innovation-only Regime – Growth Rate
From eq. (20), I get,
d ĝt+1
d
(
Ŝt+1
Ût+1
) = λγ
−φ( Ŝt+1
Ût+1
)−1−φ
Ŝt+1 +
(
Ŝt+1
Ût+1
)−φ
d Ŝt+1
d Ŝt+1
Ût+1

= λγ
−φ( Ŝt+1
Ût+1
)−1−φ
St+1 +
(
Ŝt+1
Ût+1
)−φ
Û2t+1
 [Using eq. (C1)]
= λγŜ−φt+1Û
(1+φ)
t+1
(
Ût+1 − φ
)
> 0 [Using eq. (18)]
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Appendix D
Imitation-Innovation Regime – Allocation of skilled and unskilled
human capital in imitation and innovation activities
Next by using eq. (24) and eq. (26), I get the following conditions
ψ
(
sm,t+1
um,t+1
)
=
(
sn,t+1
un,t+1
)
⇒ ψ
(
St+1 − sn,t+1
Ut+1 − un,t+1
)
=
(
sn,t+1
un,t+1
)
⇒ un,t+1 =
[
sn,t+1 Ut+1
ψ St+1 − (ψ − 1) sn,t+1
]
;
Again, um,t+1 = (Ut+1 − un,t+1)
=
[
ψ sm,t+1 Ut+1
St+1 − (ψ − 1) sn,t+1
]
; (D1)
From eq. (D1) in eq. (22) and by using (24), I get the demand for skilled human capital in the
innovation activity
(1− σ)
(
sm,t+1
um,t+1
)−σ 1
(1 + g¯)At
(1− at)
at
= γ (1− φ)
(
sn,t+1
un,t+1
)−φ
⇒ (1− σ)
[
ψUt+1(St+1 − sn,t+1)
ψSt+1 − (ψ − 1)sn,t+1
]σ
(St+1 − sn,t+1)−σ 1
(1 + g¯)At
(1− at)
at
= γ(1− φ)
[
Ut+1sn,t+1
[ψSt+1 − (ψ − 1)sn,t+1]
]φ
s−φn,t+1
⇒
[
(1− σ)ψσ(1− at)
γ(1− φ)(1 + g¯)Atat
]
Uσ−φt+1 = [ψSt+1 − (ψ − 1)sn,t+1]σ−φ
⇒ sn,t+1 =
[
ψ St+1 − h(at) Ut+1
ψ − 1
]
, (D2)
where h(at) =
[
(1−σ)ψσ(1−at)
γ(1−φ)(1+g¯)Atat
] 1
(σ−φ)
.
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From eq. (D1) and (D2), I get the demand for skilled human capital in the imitation activity
sm,t+1 = (St+1 − sn,t+1) =
[
h(at) Ut+1 − St+1
ψ − 1
]
;
Now, [ψSt+1 − (ψ − 1)sn,t+1] = h(at)Ut+1;
Therefore, un,t+1 =
[
ψSt+1 − h(at) Ut+1
(ψ − 1) h(at)
]
;
um,t+1 =
[
ψ[h(at) Ut+1 − St+1]
(ψ − 1) h(at)
]
. (D3)
Now, differentiating h(at) w.r.t at, I get,
h′(at) = − 1
(σ − φ)
[
(1− σ)ψσ(1− at)
γ(1− φ)(1 + g¯)Atat
] 1
(σ−φ)−1 [ (1− σ)ψσ
γ(1− φ)(1 + g¯)At
]
1
a2t-1
= − h(at)
(σ − φ)at(1− at) < 0. (D4)
Imitation-Innovation Regime – Growth Rate
From eq. (3), I get,
gt+1 = λ
[
uσm,t+1 s
1−σ
m,t+1
(1 + g¯)At
(
1− at
at
)
+ γ uφn,t+1s
1−φ
n,t+1
]
= λ
[
ψσ
(1 + g¯)At
h−σ(at)sm,t+1
(
1− at
at
)
+ γh−φ(at) sn,t+1
]
[Using eq. (28)]
Now, h(at) =
[
(1− σ)ψσ(1− at)
γ(1− φ)(1 + g¯)Atat
] 1
(σ−φ)
⇒ (1− at)
at
=
γ(1− φ)(1 + g¯)At
(1− σ)ψσ h
(σ−φ)(at)
Therefore, gt+1 = λ
[
ψσ h−σ(at)
γ (1− φ)
(1− σ) ψσ h
σ−φ(at) sm,t+1 + γ h−φ(at) sn,t+1
]
= λ γ h−φ(at)
[
(1− φ)
(1− σ) sm,t+1 + sn,t+1
]
= λ γ(1− φ) h−φ(at)
[
1− 2H
[
Ut +
xut
xst
St
]]
(D5)
38
Bibliography
Aghion, P., and Howitt P., (1992) “A Model of Growth Through Creative Destruction.” Econo-
metrica, 60, pp. 323-351.
Aghion, P., and Howitt, P., (2006) “Joseph Schumpeter Lecture: Appropriate Growth Policy: A
Unifying Framework” Journal of the European Economic Association, Vol. 4, No. 2/3.
Aghion, P., Boustan, L., Hoxby, C., and Vandenbussche J., (2009). “Exploiting States’ Mistakes
to Evaluate the Impact of Higher Education on Growth.”Working paper, Harvard.
Basu, S., Mehra, K. M., (2014). “Endogenous Human Capital Formation Distance to Frontier
and Growth” Research in Economics, Volume 68, Issue 2, June 2014, Pages 117132.
Barro, R. (1998). “Human capital and growth in cross-country regressions”. Mimeo Harvard
University.
Barro, R., J., and Sala-i-Martin, X., (1991). “Convergence across States and Regions.” Brookings
Papers Econ. Activity, no. 1, pp. 107-82. (a).
Barro, R., J., and Sala-i-Martin, X., (1992). “Convergence”. Journal of Political Economy, Vol.
100, No. 2 (Apr., 1992), pp. 223-251.
Barro, R., J., and Sala-i-Martin, X., (1995). “Economic Growth” MIT Press.
Borjas, G.J. and V.A. Ramey, (1995). “Foreign competition, market power, and wage inequality:
theory and evidence”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 110, 10751111.
Das, M., (2007) “Persistent inequality: An explanation based on limited parental altruism” Jour-
nal of Development Economics 84 (2007) 251270.
Di Maria C., and Stryszowski, P., (2009). “Migration, human capital accumulation and economic
development.” Journal of Development Economics 90 (2009) 306313.
Durlauf, S., and Johnson, P., (1995). “Multiple regimes and cross-country growth behavior”.
Journal of Applied Econometrics, 10, 365-384.
39
Galor, O., and Moav, O. (2000), “Ability-Biased Technological Transition, Wage Inequality, and
Economic Growth”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics.
Galor, O., and Tsiddon, D., (1997), “Technological Progress, Mobility, and Economic Growth”
The American Economic Review, Vol. 87, No. 3 (Jun., 1997), pp. 363-382.
Gerschenkron, A., ( 1962). “Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective”, Harvard Univer-
sity Press.
Hassler, J., Mora, J, R., and Zeira, J., (2007) “Inequality and mobility”, Journal of Economic
Growth, 12: 235-259.
Howitt, P., (2000) “Endogenous Growth and Cross-Country Income Differences, American Eco-
nomic Review, 90, 829-46.
Howitt, P., and Mayer-Foulkes, D., (2005). “R and D, Implementation and Stagnation: A Schum-
peterian Theory of Convergence Clubs”, Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking,Volume 37,
Number 1, pp. 147-177.
Lee, CI., and Solon, G., (2009). “Trends in intergenerational income mobility” The Review of
Economics and Statistics, Vol. 91, No. 4, Pages 766-772.
Loury, G., C., (1981). “Intergenerational Transfers and the Distribution of Earnings”, Economet-
rica, Vol. 49, No. 4 (Jul., 1981), pp. 843-867.
Maasoumia, E., Racineb, J., and Stengos, T., (2007) “Growth and convergence: A profile of
distribution dynamics and mobility”, Journal of Econometrics 136 (2007) 483508.
Mayer-Foulkes, D., (2002) “Global Divergence, Documento de Trabajo del CIDE, SDTE 250,
Divisin de Economa.
Maoz, Y., D., and Moav, O., (1999) “Intergenerational Mobility and the Process of Development”,
The Economic Journal, Vol. 109, No. 458 (Oct., 1999), pp. 677-697.
Quah, D., T., (1996a). “Convergence Empirics Across Economies with (Some) Capital Mobility”,
Journal of Economic Growth 1. 95-124.
40
Quah, D., T., (1996b). “Empirics for Economic Growth and Convergence”, European Economic
Review 40, 1353- 1375.
Quah, D., T., (1996c). “Twin Peaks: Growth and Convergence in Models of Distribution Dy-
namics”, Economic Journal 106, 1045-1055
Quah, D., T., (1996d).“Ideas Determining Convergence Clubs”, Working Paper, Economics De-
partment, LSE.
Solon, G., (2002). “Cross-Country Differences in Intergenerational Earnings Mobility”, The Jour-
nal of Economic Perspectives, Volume 16, Number 3, 1 August 2002 , pp. 59-66(8).
Vandenbussche, J., Aghion, P., Meghir, C., (2006): “Growth, Distance to Frontier and Composi-
tion of Human Capital”, Journal of Economic Growth, Vol. 11, No. 2 pp. 97-127.
41
